“8. THE KALAPALO DIETARY SYSTEM” in “Carib-Speaking Indians: Culture, Society and Language”
8. THE KALAPALO DIETARY SYSTEM
Ellen B. Basso Department of Anthropology, University of Arizona
In unusual contrast with other tropical lowland tribes of South America, members of Upper Xingu society in central Brazil customarily reject most species of land animals as food. Although visitors to the area have not failed to comment upon the peculiar dietary practices of the inhabitants, published accounts are limited to brief descriptions or lists of the kinds of food eaten by members of particular village groups (see, for example, Carneiro 1956-57; Galvão 1949; Murphy and Quain 1955; Schultz and Chiara 1971; von den Steinen 1894; Villas Boas and Villas Boas 1970). To my knowledge, there has been no detailed presentation of the dietary as a system, especially with respect to the adherents’ own statements about what should and should not be eaten, and why. The purpose of this paper, then, is to clarify the specific practice of rejecting certain animal species, by placing it within the context of the total dietary system as understood by the Kalapalo, a Carib-speaking group who are members of Upper Xingu society. In addition to describing the significant features of the Kalapalo dietary, I shall explain the logic of that system in terms of their taxonomy of “living things,” and discuss its importance as a moral code that elucidates Kalapalo cosmology.
In general the Kalapalo are quite explicit about the rules that constitute their dietary. The rules are important because adherence to the dietary is one symbol of the uniqueness of members of Upper Xingu society (kuge) as a whole and of the distinctiveness of Kalapalo (aifa otomo) in particular. The other primary symbol of this uniqueness is ifutisu behavior. Ifutisu, a highly polysemous term, refers in this context to generosity and pacificity, which are the attributes of what the Kalapalo define generally as “good” (atutu) behavior. Together with their dietary rules, ifutisu is a means by which the Kalapalo differentiate themselves from other members of Upper Xingu society, and differentiate people of that society from other categories of human beings.
Because adherence to the peculiar dietary rules and to the ideal of ifutisu are each aspects of a general notion about how human beings should behave, they are used by the Kalapalo to express disapproval towards individuals or local groups with whom they are in antagonistic relationships. For example, when individual Kalapalo wish to express hostility towards members of another village group who have accused them of witchcraft, they are able to assert their own humanitarian propensities by implying that only they (Kalapalo) eat the proper food and behave peacefully, whereas the accusers are known to eat anything and to be excessively violent like “fierce Indians” (iñikogo). The latter class of human beings includes formerly hostile neighbors of the Kalapalo (Suya, Juruna, Txukahamae Kayapo, Shavante, Txicão) who were not members of Upper Xingu society and who were known to be unpredictably aggressive (itsotu) and to value meat in their diet.
The most significant aspect of the Kalapalo dietary system is the way in which “living things” are classified according to whether they are eaten or not eaten by people of Upper Xingu society. The Kalapalo recognize that many of the animals they reject are eaten by other human beings and that for this reason it would be inappropriate to suggest that the species in question are considered inedible. Rather, the Kalapalo say that these things are unfit for consumption by themselves and other Upper Xingu people. Coupled with this rejection is an explicit definition of other kinds of living things as “eaten by Upper Xingu people.” To understand how these categories are distinguished, it will be useful to look briefly at the general principles underlying the Kalapalo system of classifying “living things.”
SYSTEMS OF CLASSIFICATION OF "LIVING THINGS"
The Kalapalo classify certain things in their experience according to a set of categories that are arranged in a hierarchy, or in a sequence of more or less inclusive units (Table 8.1). Each category is defined and differentiated from other categories in terms of a few specific attributes that the Kalapalo consider distinctive. All the referents of these categories together are known as ago, or “living things.”
At the most specific levels of their taxonomy, the Kalapalo make use of such empirical attributes as morphological characteristics, eating habits, and habitat to distinguish different kinds of natural species. The selection of one or another of these attributes often varies for pragmatic reasons. At more inclusive levels, however, some of the criteria used to differentiate categories of living things are nonobservable attributes.
TABLE 8.1Partial Taxonomy of ago, Showing Classes of “Living Things” Important in the Kalapalo Dietary System
The category “living things” is divided into several general subcategories. The most culturally significant are: kuge, “human beings”; itolo, “birds”; ηene, “land creatures”; kaηa, “water creatures”; eke, “snakes”; and i, “upright-standing plants.” All of these groups are further differentiated into mid-level taxa, many of which do not have names. At the most specific level of the hierarchy are categories containing only one item—that is, referring mainly to particular natural species or varieties of plants and animals. (Sometimes these taxa include beings believed to be visible only to shamans, however.) Table 8.1 illustrates how these categories are ordered in a hierarchic relationship, and shows in some detail the internal differentiation of those classes of “living things” that are significant for an understanding of the Kalapalo dietary system.
The category ηene, “land creatures,” includes several more specific units, among them “felines,” “deer,” “peccaries,” “rodents,” “armadillos,” “maned wolf,” “tapir,” “monkeys,” “cayman,” “molluscs,” “lizards,” and “bats.” The Kalapalo and other Upper Xingu villagers regard virtually all ηene as disgusting and refuse to eat them. The two exceptions are monkey and (sometimes) coati, which are classed together in a sub-category of ηene called kaiju. (The problem of things that are “sometimes” eaten will be discussed shortly.)
In contrast, “things that live in the water” (called kaηa) are highly prized as food. This group includes fish, turtles, the stingray, the Surinam toad (but no other frogs or toads), fresh water crabs, and (sometimes) the electric eel, giant catfish, and red piranha. Because of the value placed on kaηa, fish alone account for nearly all the protein consumed by the Kalapalo.
Birds (itolo) are divided into several categories, only a few of which are defined as “eaten.” The most important “eaten” birds are parrots and a group defined as “birds that walk on the land” (both taxa are unlabeled). The latter include doves, partridge-like species (Tinamidae), and the curassows (Cracidae). Hummingbirds, as a general class, may also be eaten, though the reason for this is unclear to me. All other kinds of birds, including water birds, owls and nightjars, vultures, birds of prey, toucans, and a multitude of small birds, are rejected. Duck (kofoηo) is an exception, because it may sometimes be eaten, depending upon whether it is considered a “land bird” or a “water bird.”
Except for plants (which seem to be of little interest to the Kalapalo during discussions of proper food), all the previously described categories of ago are also grouped by the Kalapalo into three categories that crosscut the general taxa discussed above:
I noted above that those items in the group “things no one eats” can be considered objects of a general taboo—that is, they are never eaten. Those in the second group, “things everyone eats,” are the subject of specific taboos—that is, they become temporarily prohibited for individuals in specific situations. For example, all birds that are normally eaten are prohibited for young men when they are wrestling during the time of their puberty seclusion. The prohibition is justified by a belief that this food will make their bones brittle. Similarly, the flesh of birds is also avoided by parents with young children who have not yet been weaned, for this kind of food is bad for the growth of the child’s bones. Second, kaηa (the “water creatures” that are eaten) are prohibited to persons in some kind of physical danger, especially “bleeders” (women after childbirth, menstruating women, boys whose ears have just been pierced), and to seriously ill individuals, their parents, siblings, and offspring. Third, monkey is prohibited to boys who have just undergone ear piercing. However, this prohibition is part of a general fast, during which their diet is exclusively vegetarian. After a period of eating manioc and fruit, monkey becomes the first non-vegetable food eaten by these boys.
The first category of tabooed items, birds, is prohibited as weakening for persons who are in critical periods of growth: adolescents and young children. This association may be considered “sympathetic,” in that there is a direct association between the subject and object of the taboo: weak bones are caused by eating the flesh of brittle-boned birds. In the case of the second set of taboos, those focused on the eating of kaηa, the association is a “negative” one between this category of living things and persons who are in physical danger. It is not clear, nor can the Kalapalo say, why there is such a correlation.
The third taboo, that concerned with monkey, appears on only one occasion, when it is part of a general fast. Thus, monkey can be considered the supremely edible item in the Kalapalo diet, a kind of food that is acceptable in all circumstances but one. A clue to why this is so lies in the Kalapalo justification for eating monkey in the first place, even though it belongs to the generally prohibited ηene category. The Kalapalo say, “People of the Upper Xingu eat monkeys because they are like human beings.” Some of the ways in which the Kalapalo speak of different kinds of “living things” help to explain this statement, and to these 1 shall now turn.
COSMOLOGICAL LABELS AND THEIR USE IN SPEECH
The category ago, “living things,” can also be thought of as a member of a paradigmatic set1 in which four categories are defined in terms of two intersecting dimensions. Each one of these categories, taken alone, represents a specific model consisting of several defining attributes. The use of a term labeling such a category signals how some thing in Kalapalo experience behaves toward, or is related to, a human being. These behavioral attributes and relationships contribute to conceptualizations of the possible relationships between humans and nonhumans, and thus they can be thought of as crucial features of a general model of “Xingu humanity” or “Xingu distinctiveness.”
Kalapalo men dancing with Kuikuru women in the latter’s village
The Structure of the Paradigmatic Set
The four categories that compose the paradigmatic set (see Table 8.2) are ordered through the intersection of two dimensions: (a) what I have termed the “human metaphor” and (b) the suffix indicating “possession.” The paradigmatic ordering of these categories is an analytic structure devised by the anthropologist, for the Kalapalo do not explicitly compare and contrast the categories with one another, nor can they make general statements about the two dimensions. The importance of these dimensions is demonstrated, however, by their continual and predictable appearance in speech.
TABLE 8.2Paradigm of Kalapalo Cosmological Terms
The phrase “human metaphor" subsumes a set of terms that refer to physiological and social phenomena and that are used when speaking about things called ago, “living things.” Even though the terms are most often applied to human beings, they are acceptable for speaking about nonhumans as well. The following are examples of this human metaphor used by the Kalapalo.
- growth (atukulu) and death (apïηgulu)
- offspring (itijipïgï) and parents (oto)
- names for parts of the body
The use of human metaphor is a means of explaining relationships between classes of things and thereby implying that all “living things” hold in common certain attributes. By speaking of nonhuman beings in terms normally associated with humans, the Kalapalo make the more general relationship between nonhumans and humans one of explicit closeness, admitting of possible intimacy. This potentially intimate association often becomes realized in mythological incidents, in which humans and nonhumans engage in sexual relations and produce offspring. Belief in the possession of common attributes is not only explicitly stated by Kalapalo; it is also evident in the similar treatment of human offspring and members of a wide variety of natural species, especially with respect to procedures for influencing growth and behavior.
The second dimension of the paradigm refers to the suffix /gï/ (allomorphs are /gï/, /gu/, /sï/, /su/), indicating a “thing or attribute that is possessed.” It must be affixed to the term for any object or thing (for example, material objects, ceremonies) whose possession is indicated during the course of the utterance; it also occurs as an element in the structure of names for classes of things that can be considered “normally possessed”—for example, parts of the body.
To summarize, the paradigm formed by the dimensions “presence or absence of the human metaphor” and “presence or absence of the suffix indicating possession” contains the categories ago, “living things,” iηikogu, “possessions,” itologu, “pets,” and itseke, “monsters.” The Kalapalo conception of these four categories is discussed below.
Kalapalo Models of the Paradigmatic Categories
Ago, “living things.” These are all spoken of in terms of the human metaphor, but they do not take the possession indicator. The term ago labels the highest-level taxon in the hierarchy discussed earlier, but as I suggest below, it also connotes features not made explicit in native definitions of that category.
Itologu, “pets.” When speaking of “pets,” the Kalapalo make use of the human metaphor, and they also attach the suffix indicating possession to the pets’ taxonomic names. Birds, monkeys, and turtles are the only wildlife kept as pets. Other animals are occasionally captured and briefly held in the village until they die of maltreatment or lack of food; such animals are not referred to as itologu, except in jest. Dogs are considered “pets,” but they were apparently introduced into the area relatively recently and only after Brazilian contacts were made. (Compare the Kalapalo word for dog, katsawgo, and the Brazilian chachorro).
Like their wild ago counterparts, “pets” are spoken about in terms of the human metaphor, but another set of symbols, having reference to the parent-child relationship among humans, establishes a deeper metaphorical relationship. The Kalapalo view the relationship between itologu and oto (“pet” and “owner”) as being characterized on the human side by nurture and protection within a household, and on the animal side by lack of ifutisu (in the specific sense of shyness)—in other words, by being tame. This relationship is particularly interesting because the distinctive features are also those that define the filiative relationship—that between human parents and their children. Children and pets alike are supposed to be fed, reared, and kept protected within the confines of the house; they share an intimacy with their oto (this word means, among other things, both “parent” and “owner”) that is characterized by informality and lack of restraint. Often pets are secluded like human adolescents “to make them grow beautiful,” especially when the animal is a young bird able to provide its owner with valuable feathers as it reaches maturity.
Although itologu may be members of ago species generally defined as “eaten by Upper Xingu people,” they themselves are never eaten, nor should they be killed. Ideally, such animals are supposed to be buried when they die, rather than be discarded or fed to another pet. Both unnamed children (such as stillbirths or infants who die during postpartum seclusion) and pets are buried near the hammock of the parent or owner. Pet birds are the only animals held to have a village of the dead. As men who die travel to the village of dead men located to the east where the sun rises, so dead pets go to their village of the dead located in the direction of the sunset. (It is perhaps for this reason that men are buried with heads facing east, pet birds with heads facing west.) Thus the itologu-oto relationship is conceived of as a special emotional tie between humans and nonhumans, and it takes on even greater meaning through association with symbols of vital importance in human life-crisis rituals.
Iηikogu, “possessions.” Human metaphor is not applied to items referred to by this term, but the possession indicator is always used. Included in this category are things that are normally possessed, such as items received as payment (fipïgï), water in a container, harvested crops, and material paraphernalia such as fish hooks, arrows, hammocks, baskets, ceramics, and feather ornaments. A person who is oto (owner) has usually acquired his possessions through some form of exchange—social prestation (such as widow remarriage payment, payment to a ceremonial performer, payment for grave digging), personal buying and selling, or the uluki, “trade ceremony,” The transactions in all of these instances are legitimate means of exchanging wealth (see Dole 1956-57; 1956-58; 1966). Although different things appear in each kind of exchange, they are referred to generally as fipïgï, “payment.” In addition, a person may of course manufacture something himself, or, as is usually the case with a “pet,” he may capture it in the wild. In all of these situations, the resultant relationship is one of “property” to “owner.”
Itseke, “monsters.” Human metaphor is not applied by the Kalapalo to items referred to as itseke, nor is the possession indicator used. The category includes celestial phenomena (which are not included in the taxonomy of “living things”) and items that are considered monstrous in some way. The Kalapalo consider itseke potentially malevolent beings, but this aspect of their nature is apparent only in discussions of the relationships between itseke and humans, and cannot be derived from the paradigmatic criteria. Because of their potential malevolence towards human beings, itseke are creatures that are both physically dangerous (tekotiñi) and violent (itsotu). They are believed to cause harm in several specific ways: (1) by projecting kwifi, or invisible darts, into a victim’s body; (2) by capturing a person’s shadow (akuagï); and (3) by merely presenting themselves to the sight of a human being.
Itseke are also characterized by their unusual and shocking appearance. Some itseke are known for their ability to transform themselves, while others are considered monstrous because they suddenly and inexplicably appear to be different from normal phenomena. Itseke may appear monstrous because they combine morphological attributes from different categories of “living things,” or simply because they are abnormally large in size (compare tsekegï, “[having the property of] large size,” and itseke, “monster”). Thus the names of many itseke take the form: (1) name for some ordinary low-level taxon in the ago hierarchy, plus (2) the suffix /kuegï/, an augmentative with the implication of “potential malevolence,” and thus of “monstrosity.” Examples of itseke names are: Safundukuegï, “monstrous bass-fish”; Tifagikuegï, “monstrous stingray”; Tĩtsahakuegï, “monstrous giant kiskadee”; Itaukuegï, “monstrous women” (water sirens).
Having now specified the Kalapalo models associated with each of the four categories, I would like to turn to specific examples of contextually varying classification, which demonstrate how these models are symbolized by use of the categories in Kalapalo speech.
Situational Variation in the Use of the Paradigmatic Concepts
The use of the four cosmological labels often appears contradictory, since, while they mark categories defined in terms of specific and mutually exclusive relationship attributes, different labels are often applied to the same specific things. This apparent anomaly is easily explained, for these attributes are meaningful only during specific situations in which some kind of relationship with or behavior towards a human being is indicated, and such a relationship or kind of behavior may change or cease to exist in some other situation.
As I noted earlier, the relationships between parent and child and between pet and owner are defined by the Kalapalo in terms of similar normative behaviors. These similarities are the basis for a metaphorical use of the term itologu to refer to a child who has come under the nurture and protection of a nonrelative. Although adoption (wherein a child is jurally considered offspring of someone other than its real parent) is unknown among the Kalapalo, fosterage is quite common. In the latter case, a child is raised by a relative of a deceased parent (usually a sibling), but in no way is this considered, or referred to as, a parent-child relationship. Because of ifutisu, the Kalapalo ideal of generosity, kinsmen of a deceased person have an obligation to care for orphaned children. However, when a nonkinsman takes charge of such a child for no apparent reason (that is, with no prior obligation based on ifutisu), the child is called itologu of the person supporting it. This special metaphorical use of the term indicates recognition of a behavioral relationship similar to that between owner and pet, since it includes nurture and protection of an immature being provided without any prior relationship or obligation. A child is of course also considered a “human being” (kuge, which is a category of “living thing”) and is referred to as such when the speaker wishes the child to be distinguished from another living thing. The use of itologu in reference to a child is thus an example of contextually varying classification.
When a Kalapalo wants to specify an animal’s identity as pet of some human being, the term itologu is used. This is often done when the speaker needs to stress the fact that the animal in question is not an ordinary ago. For example, if a person wants to kill and eat a bird or monkey he sees roaming the village, another can refer to it as itologu of a specific individual, thus denying the suitability of such an idea. In general, then, the use of the term itologu appears to be a special reference to a certain kind of social relationship that can exist between men and “living things” that are nonrelatives. The latter may or may not be human beings. As we saw earlier, however, when the Kalapalo want to emphasize the dimension of “ownership”—whether of an animal or any other possession—the term iηikogu is applied.
The use of the term itseke appears to involve a situational denial of some of the same human-like attributes that are indicated for other categories by the use of human metaphor. For example, morphologically human heroic figures are mythically associated in human-like relationships and situations, and yet these beings are nonetheless referred to as itseke. In such instances, the term symbolizes the endowment of these characters with nonhuman attributes, which to the Kalapalo are truly “abnormal” and therefore awesome. Mythological characters (and the dead) have the ability to change their shape, engage in fearful destruction, and change or invent things.
As with itologu, items that are normally eaten are rejected if they are labeled itseke. For example, on one occasion a very tasty fish the Kalapalo call wagiti was rejected as appropriate food by some Kalapalo men because a water rat had been found in its stomach. When I asked them why they did not eat the fish, which they had thrown away during a period of extreme scarcity, they explained that the wagiti was not in fact food at all, since it was not kaηa but rather itseke and therefore inedible. When I then suggested that fish occasionally were found to have such things inside them, the men assured me that only itseke would eat ηene, “land creatures.” The proper diet of fish was defined as other fish and various plant materials, according to the species. This incident illustrates how things normally classed as ago are considered itseke on the basis of attributes that are considered antithetical to those of human behavior. In this case, a decision was made to classify something normally considered “fish” as itseke on the basis of a dietary practice considered improper according to Kalapalo rules about eating.
Kalapalo women singing in the village plaza
Kalapalo women preparing piqui (a cultivated fruit) and manioc soup for a ceremonial food distribution
At this point, we may return to the question of why the Kalapalo justify their eating monkey by the phrase, “It is like human beings.” The examples given above illustrate a generalization that can be made about Kalapalo cosmology. This system incorporates a morality according to which things in the universe that manifest human-like behavior (adhering to a diet similar to that of Upper Xingu people, and acting peacefully) are extolled and embraced, and things behaving otherwise (especially, having an indiscriminate diet and acting violently) are denigrated and avoided. Thus the Kalapalo dietary, by specifying indirectly that only human-like creatures are to be eaten, is a specific metaphorization of Kalapalo cosmology. Put differently, the consumption of food is given a uniquely Kalapalo meaning through symbols that constitute the Kalapalo world view.
REFERENCES
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